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MEXICAN INDIAN POLICY
IN NEW MEXICO
DANIEL TYLER

INDiAN

POLICY REQUIRES, but does not always receive, precise
definition. It can include the ideological principles of a nation's
leaders; decrees, pronouncements, laws, and regulations at several
levels of government; the execution of mandates by government
employees (civil and military); and the actual treatment of Indians
by frontiersmen whose sometimes prejudicial contact with Indians
resulted in twisted historical verdicts belying the original intent of
policy makers. The subject is further complicated by time and
place, for what may be considered "policy" for one group of Indians in one part of the country during one decade might be irrelevant for others in different circumstances.
The intent of this essay, therefore, is to focus only on the nomadic Indians of the northern Mexican frontier, New Mexico in
particular, and to determine if political and military authorities in
Mexico followed a recognizable policy toward them in t~e 18211848 period. Since Mexico as a nation had proclaimed equality
for all its inhabitants, the struggle between Indians and Mexicans
in the frontier areas might have been significantly affected. What
was the Indian policy that evolved?
This paper briefly reviews the Spanish background of Indian
policy and the ideological debate that emerged in Mexico when
the war for independence had ~ucceeded and the leaders were
faced with the challenge of incorporating revolutionary ideals in
national policy. Most of the research, however, concentrates on
the communication between Mexico's Secretaria de Guerra y
Marina (the War Department) and the comandancias of
Chihuahua and Santa Fe. Through this official correspondence
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Mexican authorities, from the president to the Comandante Principal in Santa Fe, articulated an Indian policy, revealed how it
was affected by changing local and national circumstances, and
proved in the long run that the Spaniards had established guidelines in Indian policy still worthy of implementation.
One must begin with the Spanish legacy. As of 1821 Spanish Indian policy for the northern frontier reflected the plans of the Marques de Rubes Dictamen of 1768, the Reglamento of 1772, the
Royal Order of 1779, and the Instrucci6n of 1786-the last named
directive being a "synthesis of the policies of the past. . . . "1 So
serious was the problem of Indian devastation in the Borderlands
area during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, that Spain
had agreed to create a separate political jurisdiction, the Provincias Internas, under a military governor whose power was nearly
equal to that of the viceroy of New Spain.
When Viceroy Bernardo de Galvez issued the Instrucci6n of
1786 to Comandante Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, he gave Spanish Indian policy the force of a royal ordinance that "remained fundamental policy throughout the remainder of the Spanish period."2
In spelling out a procedure for dealing with the indios barbaros,
Galvez spoke from the personal experience of having fought the
Apaches in Nueva Vizcaya. To him, this tribe, which more than
any other had necessitated the creation of the Provincias Internas,
was composed of superior warriors whose talents in war far surpassed those of the Spanish presidials. Moving quickly without encumbrances or excess paraphernalia, willing to suffer thirst and
eating only sabandijas (reptiles and insects) on campaign,
laughing and singing in the face of death, and patient enough to
wait an entire month for the right moment to attack, the Apaches,
according to Galvez, were twice as effective in battle as the
Spaniards. 3
But he also viewed them with compassion and directed his
troops to consider the broader Spanish objective of including these
Indians as citizens of New Spain. Thus, the Instrucci6n of 1786,
and subsequent pronouncements, conceived of a plan of both war
.and peace designed to impress the Indians with the might of
Spanish arms but flexible enough to keep open the path to friendship when peace was genuinely sought. The Apaches were singled
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out as the most troublesome. Commanders were encouraged to exploit divisions among them and the nations of the North, but were
told that even "a bad peace . . . was better than a good war."4
Trade with the "savages" was to be promoted but regulated; presents were to go to peaceful tribes; and both firearms and liquor
were to be introduced among the Indians that they might become
more dependent on Spanish manufacturers.
When the first demands for Mexican independence began to
sweep across the northern 'frontier in 1810, Galvez's policies were
still in evidence. New Mexico under Juan Bautista de Anza had
achieved, by then, a generation of peace with Comanches; Navajos had been wooed away from the Gila Apaches; and Utes, Comanches, and Navajo leaders had been urged to join in a war of
revenge against the dreaded Apaches. s
According to Pedro Bautista Pino's report in 1812 to the Spanish Cortes, only the Apaches remained incorrigible. Navajos, he
said, had become civilized through farming, Comanches were fulfilling the conditions of peace treaties, and the money-hungry Utes
had come in for peace to improve their chances of good trade rela.tions. 6 A Fondo de Aliados was established in the Santa Fe
Presidio "to supply gifts and rations to nomadic Indians who had
made peace and to feed them whenever they appeared in Santa Fe
for talks."7 Indian allies (Pueblos and genizaros) participated in
military campaigns as scouts, soldiers, and interpreters. Although
divided on the muster rolls by race, "they proved formidable
soldiers in battle . . . since they held little fear of the savage
plains tribes." 8
Trade with the nomads was encouraged and regulated by license, but the westward penetration of Anglo-Americans began to
demolish "the structure of alliances which an enlightened Spanish
policy had built among the tribes surrounding New Mexico,',g and
the suspicion was soon planted that Washington's objectives
might include the interruption of trade arrangements, possession
of land, and an alliance with the Plains Indians in a war against
New Spain's northern frontier. 10 Since the center of Indian problems on this frontier had been Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico in
the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the westward ~ovement
of Americans, combined with the struggle for independence in
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New Spain, presented serious challenges to the doctrines enunciatedby Galvez twenty-five years earlier.
Indications of a changed role fOr Indians were apparent in
1812. The constitution of that year was annulled by Ferdinand
VII's return to the throne, but when it was proclaimed in Mexico
on May 31, 1820, combined with the rebel Constitution of Apatzingan of 1814, "the Indian was restored.to his position of equality with the white man." II Between 1810 and 1821 Hidalgo,
Morelos, and Iturbide went on record favoring Indians,12 and their
plans and decrees made clear that a major change was taking
place in the desired status of Mexican Indians.
The Plan of Iguala, February 24, 1821, specified that everyone
-African, Indian, and European-was a citizen with equal rights
to employment and protection from the government. 13 Six months
later the Treaty of Cordova converted Mexico into a sovereign
state and reaffirmed the same principles. 14 Although the Constitution of 1824 did not mention Indians directly, the Plan of Mexico
of January 27, 1827, made clear that Indians were to enjoy the
rights and privileges conceded to them, and in subsequent legislative acts defining Mexican citizenship, Indians were officially considered Mexicans with the same rights and responsibilities as any
other race. IS
Even the word "Indian" was supposed to be abolished on public
and private documents. Congressional deputies proposed in 1824
that "indio, in common acceptance as a term of opprobrium for a
large portion of our citizens, be abolished from public usage."16 In
subsequent debates, congressional deputies referred to "los
llamados indios "17 or, in the case of Indian towns and land, "indigene" was acceptable. IS
But the Chamber of Deputies was almost equally divided in its
opinion on the matter of equality for the Indians. 10 Liberals
wanted to eliminate the Indian problem by denying their political
existence. They blamed the Spaniards for causing Indian poverty,
and they believed that by converting the Indians into legally free
citizens, by abolishing ideas of "racial, caste, and class distinctions," they could rectify the harmfulness of Spain's paternalism. 20
Those in opposition, the Conservatives and the Church, ad-
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vocated a return to the colonial mission system. The dogma of
equality, they argued, was "inapplicable to a heterogeneous society,"21 and to the clergy, the very idea of a republic was
repulsive. 22 As the years passed, the Conservative position grew
stronger, not only because Indians refused to embrace their new
freedom as the Liberals had predicted, but also because a policy of
egalitarianism was difficult to endorse while Liberals espoused
simultaneously a creole view of Mexican nationality.23 So the Conservatives made political capital of the Liberal dilemma while Indian uprisings broke out across the nation from the Yucatan to the
Yaqui Valley in Sonora.
By its indecision and preoccupation with other matters, Congress abandoned any pretense of leading the nation toward an innovative Indian policy. Each state was left to determine for itself
how to incorporate Indians into the new Mexican society.24 In
New Mexico the decision making fell into the hands of an administrative arrangement established under the Provincias Internas.
Chihuahua, New Mexico, Durango, Sinaloa, and Sonora came
under the control of Comandantes Especiales de Armas who
. reported to the Comandante General at Chihuahua. 25 This arrangement was modified slightly in 1824 when New Mexico was
at first included as part of the state of Interno del Norte and then
designated a territory subject to the Comandancia General in
Chihuahua. 26 Since the Congress did not immediately pass an
organic law for the territories,27 Indian affairs became the responsibility of the Chihuahua Comandancia and its subordinate Comandancia Principal in Santa Fe. Throughout the Mexican period,
the execution of Indian policy in New Mexico was the primary responsibility of the governor or his military counterpart acting, for
the most part, under the orders of the Chihuahua Comandancia.
As a result of the tumultuous events in the mid-1830s, New Mexico
was finally promoted to the rank of Comandancia General in
1839, and comments on Indian matters were exchanged directly
with the Secretarfa de Guerra y Marina. In 1845 this status was
withdrawn. 28 Regardless of these minor adjustments, the fact remains that Indian policy was influenced by the national struggle
between federalism and centralism and by the Hispanic sense of
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hierarchy which kept a line of communication open from the
president to the Comandante Principal in New Mexico.
What were the ingredients of this policy? Prior to the revolutions in Texas, California, and New Mexico in the mid-1830s, and
the centralization of political power in the hands of Antonio
L6pez de Santa Anna, Indian problems on the northern frontier
were of relatively little concern to the government in Mexico City.
Numerous documents support the contention that money, weapons, horses, and supplies were woefully inadequate to cope with
nomadic Indians. Additionally, the militia law of 1826, which
guaranteed New Mexico three presidial companies of cavalry plus
two militia companies, was nothing more than a gesture of good
intent appearing in the records of Congress. 29 Civil governors
often hired the service of scalp hunters, when no other recourse
was available, to strike some degree of terror into the hearts of the
freely roaming, gregarious Indian tribes. 30
New Mexicans were forced to recognize the central government's policy of benign neglect, and their attitudes toward the
nomadic Indians reflected the fact that the Rio Grande communities had been on their own for a long time. Very little local
sentiment favored the Liberal's egalitarian philosophy.3l Surrounded by Apaches, Navajos, Utes, Comanches, and Kiowas, the
territory had expended much of its energy in just holding on. The
scars of past wounds, the vicious cycle of attack and revenge, and
the determination of the Indians to profit from the Mexicans without being conquered by them were causes for suspicion on both
sides. These roots were deep in the Spanish period. Non-Pueblo Indians, therefore, were "gentiles, " "naciones barbaras, " "naciones
errantes y sin residencia," "tribus barbaras del Norte," "indigenas," "salvajes," and "gandules" (a word which meant
"tramp," "bum," or "brave," depending on how it was used).
They were not Mexican citizens as the Liberals had hoped. they
would become in 1824; they were not equal to the creoles, mestizos, and Pueblos; and they needed to be dealt with in such a way
that they learned first and foremost to respect the arms of the Mexican nation.
Thus, the first criteria of Mexican Indian policy was to demonstrate a war-making capability that Indians would respect. Lack-
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ing the military support they needed, New Mexicans were forced
to adapt their situation to the general precepts of the Galvez Instrucci6n. As they expanded to'the west toward Cubero, incidents
between Mexicans and Navajos increased dramatically. Heightened by slave raiding on both sides, the situation deteriorated into
a constant state of war. The Mexicans could not win because they
could not carry the offensive into Navajo country for a long
enough period of time. Troops had to be paid, and fields and
flocks needed attention. But Mexican authorities exploited the
division they encountered among Navajos. "Friendlies" were offered coin, trade goods, and paid service in a Navajo company
specifically detailed for war against their brethren, the
"hostiles."32 Most New Mexicans believed that Navajos did not
deserve peace. Although a treaty had been signed in 1823, and
seven others had been made between 1805 and 1846,33 frequent
treaty violations on both sides and the lingering distrust of foes
who had warred against each other for generations made permanent peace impossible.
To the Comandancia in Chihuahua, Comanches were a far
more serious problem than Navajos. Pressing southwest from the
Plains toward the New Mexican settlements, these Indians infiltrated the entire northern frontier and forced Apaches into the
laps of the Mexicans. The Comandancia urged local officials to remain neutral, to let Comanches and Apaches fight each other, and
to suggest peace only as the occasion demanded. 34 Since the days
of the Provincias Internas, Comanches had replaced Apaches as
enemy number one. They ra'ided so far into Mexican territory that,
from the viewpoint of officials in Chihuahua, a peace was clearly
warranted. One was signed in 1826. It included the delivery of
medals and canes, the promise of an annuity to designated chiefs,
and a Comanche agreement that they would not cross the Pecos
River into Chihuahua or Coahuila without first seeking permission from the Comandancia. Comanches agreed to these terms
and promised to include the Kiowas. 35
But the fears of New Mexicans along the eastern fringe were
only mildly assuaged. In a plea from the New Mexican territorial
assembly to its delegate in Congress, the threat of ComancheKiowa invasion gave singular evidence of the real terror asso-
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ciated with Comanche activities from Abiquiu through Taos and
south to EI Paso. 36 By 1831 the Comandancia was forced to
declare, war on the Comanche nation. Citizens were implored to
provide logistical support, arms, munitions, and horses required
for an extended campaign. 37 As the war continued, small amounts
of money and tax exemptions were available to those who fought
the enemy.
By 1835 the Comandancia was sanguine about ending the Comanche war, but help from the Apaches was going to be required. 38
Although they had effectively separated New Mexico from the rest
of the nation by seizing control of the area between Socorro and EI
Paso, exacting tolls from the few intrepid travelers,39 Apache
bands were seen as natural allies in the incessant war with Comanches. Occasionally, they, too, incited the Mexicans to arms against
them, but in comparison to the frightful damage done by the western Apaches in Sonora,40 Chihuahua and New Mexico fared rather
well and viewed Apaches as useful allies.
Peace was established with a principal Apache capitancillo in
1835. 41 In communicating the news of this peace treaty to the central government, the Comandante in Chihuahua noted that "the
Apaches up to now have not failed me nor have they caused me
the least injury, because they know that I do not deceive them." In
a similar spirit of friendship, the Apache leader, Juan Jose Compa,
expressed his deep regret over past hostilities and urged the Mexicans to make additional peace treaties with, their relatives, the
Coyoteros and Mescaleros. 42 But the Mescaleros were the enemy.
Mexicans were warned to' distinguish between them and Indians
who were peaceful. 43 A few years later, however, Gilefio Apaches
agreed to peace terms with all the Mexican states of the northern
frontier. They promised to provide an accurate census, to wear
white handkerchiefs on their heads, and to assist in wars against
the Comanche even if other Apaches were among the enemy. They
agreed to brand their animals, sell weapons only to those who
were at peace with the Mexicans, deliver criminals to Mexican
authorities, remain in one place until a home had been located for
them, and ask permission when they wished to visit the Mescaleros. 44
'
Clearly, the peace objective with the Apaches was consistent
with Galvez's orders to exploit the existing discord between
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Apaches and the nations of the North. With Utes attacking Abiquiu and Taos, Pawnees intruding aggressively as far south as the
Pueblo of San }uan,4S' and Comanches threatening the north and
east, an alliance with Apaches was justifiable. A bad peace, said
Galvez, was better than a good war, and with this principle, the
Chihuahua Comandancia WClS in fult'accord. 46
Even more effective, however, than the war-peace policy was
the continuation of the Spanish custom of gift giving. A Fondo de
Aliados was established in Santa Fe with money provided from the
national treasury (Hacienda Publica). These funds were used to
buy vermillion, corn, mirrors, knives, bridle bits, buttons, scissors,
bright cloth, and other gewgaws for delivery to the surrounding
tribes. Strict accounts were kept in the military records of the
Presidial Company of Santa Fe. 47 As in the Spanish period, the
Fonda was intended to make the Indians hungry for Spanish
food and goods. It was consistent with the objective introduced by
Galvez of making the Indians dependent on Hispanic civilization.
In the Mexican period, the gifts were intended for all "naciones
amigas,"48 and these groups seem to have included, at one time or
another, all the nomadic tribes that lived in or around New Mexico.
Another Spanish tactic had been the use of Indian allies. This
policy the Mexicans also pursued. Apaches, as we have seen, were
used against Comanches; Santa Clara, Taos, Isleta, Acoma and
Laguna Indians were organized against Navajos.49 Militia muster
roles were filled with Indians from other pueblos where the
primary motive for siding with the Mexicans was to acquire the
spoils of war and seek revenge for previous damages incurred at
the hands of the gentiles.
In this way, New Mexicans maintained the status quo, since the
principle of federalism and the Constitution of 1824 had essentially left the states and territories to deal with the Indians as best they
could and with limited resources. What happened to Indian policy
in the ten years preceding the Mexican War reflects the nation's
increasing concern about the instability of the Borderlands area, a
more aggressive attitude on the part of Texans and Santa Fe
traders, and the political centralizati~n of the government at the
hands of President Santa Anna.
To begin with, New Mexico became a department in 1836 when
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Early 19th Century New Mexican Indian fighter. Courtesy of
Press Inc., Chicago.
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Santa Anna abolished the Constitution of 1824. All departments
were expected to take control of their finances and resolve Indian
problems without relying on other government agencies. so A few
years later, the military designation of Comandancia Principal
was upgraded to Comandancia General, freeing New Mexico
from its subservience to Chihuahua. Both politically and militarily, New Mexico was made directly responsible to the central
government. Santa Fe approved this change, but the increased
power also implied greater responsibility.
To alleviate money problems, New Mexico was authorized to
receive revenue from the customs houses at Guaymas and MazatIan. The income was to be used specifically in the pursuit of an
enlightened Indian policy.51 Monthly allocations of five thousand
pesos were to enable New Mexicans to conduct their affairs with
the Indians without having to dip deeply into their own pockets.
Though this money was rarely delivered, it revealed a concern on
the part of the central government which had been absent during
the first ten years of Mexican rule. Additional decrees exempted
New Mexico from forced loans to payoff the international debt to
the United States while others authorized the taxation of distilleries, games, shops, and amusements for the purpose of raising
additional funds. 52 In the 'hands of an unscrupulous governor, new
, revenue measures could have been an open invitation to corruption, but the record does not support the contention of some that
Manuel Armijo was a petty crook who pocketed all the money for;
his personal gain.
After 1837, Armijo was the man of the hour. The Indian policy
that evolved over the next few years was greatly influenced by his
good reputation in Mexico City and his brand of frontier leadership. Governor of New Mexico from 1827 to 1829, and leader of
the movement that quashed the uprising of 1837, Armijo again occupied the governor's office frqm 1837 to 1843 and from 1845 to
1846. Acknowledged as a talented Indian fighter,53 he inherited a
Navajo war that his predecessor had tried and failed to resolve
with the largest force of militia and Indian auxiliaries ever sent
against them. 54 Armijo taxed merchants and incoming caravans of
angry Americans to raise money and continue the war. 55 In the'
opinion of Armijo, "the central government and his own depart-
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ment might force the wild tribes into a condition of dependency"
if war could be waged effectively for a long enough period of
time. 56 To some extent his policy was vindicated with peace
treaties in 1839, 1841, and 1844, but the battle with the Navajos
was never completely won.
Other measures were necessary to control the nomads. Following the direction of earlier policymakers, Armijo continued the
practice of gift-giving and regulating trade. He insisted that
citizens remain on the 'frontier even when their homes were
threatened, 57 and he organized the militia and Indian allies to
police areas where contraband was supposedly entering the
department. Even his land grant policies reflected a desire to settle
the outlying areas as insurance against foreign invasion as well as
a means to continue the commercial relations with Plains Indians
which he deemed so important. He wanted that trade to be conducted openly with peaceful Indians, and he worked to eliminate
the tradition of taking and selling slaves which had done so much
to destroy amicable relations. 58 But traders like the Comancheros
were hard to control, and when they had to compete with the guns
and liquor of incoming Americans, trade regulation became
almost impossible.
From the standpoint of the central government, New Mexico's
Indian problems became increasingly worthy of attention during
the 1840s. In a memorial to Congress, the Secretaria de Guerra y
Marina described the abandoned condition of presidial companies
along the northern frontier, the state of war existing since 1832
between Mexicans and Indians, and the terrible destruction of
property. He noted that Comanches had penetrated to within four
leagues of the capital of Durango, that Zacatecas was in a state of
panic, and even San LUIS PotosI had suffered attacks from the indios barbaros. Although peace had been achieved with the Gilefio
and Lipan Apaches as well as with Kiowas, the memorial made
clear that other Apache bands, along with Comanche, Navajo,
Yaqui, and Papago Indians, were in a state of rebellion from
Sonora to Tamaulipas. Although Mexican citizens were doing
everything in their power to respond to the situation, they were being victimized by the "ingrates from Texas" who encouraged the
Indians to invade Mexican territory. 59
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The possibility of a Texas invasion, with or without the Indians,
caused the central government .to make a final, albeit subtle, modification in Indian policy. For the first time, the official correspondence began to speak directly of "extermination" and
"destruction" of the Indians as a viable objective. 60 Communications from Guerra y Marina expressed presidential zeal for New
Mexico's search and destroy missions, and these words of encouragement included several personal statements to Armijo that
he continue to lead the defense of the territory against all foes just
as he had during the revolution of 1837. 61 More arms, supplies,
and money were ordered for New Mexico; auxiliary troops from
other departments were attached to the Santa Fe presidio; and by
1846, the President had ordered the treasury to provide New
Mexico with "all the resources available to the Supreme Government. "62 Thus, the primary concern of an Anglo-Saxon invasion
resulted in a more aggressive approach toward New Mexico's In- .
dian problems.
Indian policy had begun to merge with the nation's preoccupation with foreign invasion. New Mexico was urged to cooperate
with Chihuahua and other departments in order to maximize the
force available for retaliatory attacks. The number of soldiers
available for duty in New Mexico increased to more than 200, and
the Campania Aetiva de Chihuahua became a visible indication
that Santa Fe presidials were finally getting some help. Armijo obviously believed that cooperation with other departments was the
,new order of the day, and when the Texans' appeared to be invading again in 1843, he urged Chihuahua, Durango, and Sonora
to come to his aid. 63
Military cooperation between departments, assignment 'of auxiliary troops to the northernmost presidio, more arms and munitions, and a more personalized relationship between the central
government and Armijo-these were the ingredients of Mexican
Indian policy on the eve of the war with the United States.
Nothing had really changed from the days of Galvez, but New
Mexicans must have felt some satisfaction that at last their long
struggle with the nomadic Indians was eliciting a response from
Mexico City. They were careful not to cross the "Rio de Arcansa"
while chasing Utes in 1845 because they respected the govern-
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ment's treaty agreements with the United States;64 and when they
heard that they might be swapped to the United States in a financial settlement involving U.S.-Mexican grievances, they protested
vigorously and declared that they would rather become an independent nation: the Republica Mexicana del Norte. 65
But for all their patriotism and pride as a Mexican community,
New Mexicans still faced an Indian problem that had worsened in
the 1840s. The Navajo had joined forces with the Utes to attack
outlying Mexican communities. They appeared to be raiding at
will, extending their range of operation out onto the Plains where
they interfered in the status quo existing between Comanches and
other tribes.66 Apache activity south of Socorro was so vigorous
that this part of New Mexico came to be known as "la tierra
afuera,"67 while in the north the Utes became so infuriated by the
continuing slavery expeditions of the Mexicans that they made an
attack on the New Mexican governor in his own office. The situation had become so critical by 1845 that the Comandante General
of Chihuahua proposed the establishment of a series of military
colonies along the same lines Croix suggested in 1778. 68 All of the
northern frontier was affected by this state of affairs causing
soldiers to be diverted from the crisis with Texas and the United
States to the Indian wars of the northern Borderlands. 69
Even Armijo fell out of grace. The central government bitterly
criticized him for not carrying out the laws and using the resources that had been made available to him. 70 Other Mexicans
threw up their hands in frustration and praised Anglo-American.
Indian policy for its forthright approach to the primary issue of
survival. 71 When the Americans conquered New Mexico, therefore, they found the same Indians unchas~ized and equally cynical
of the new sovereign.
Clearly, the Mexican Indian policy had failed in New Mexico
but not because the plan was radical or out of touch with reality.
The strategems employed to maintain peace were essentially an
echo of the Galvez policies: gift giving, trade regulation, military
campaigns with the support of Indian allies and militiamen, and
peace treaties with tribes that showed a desire for friendship.
There also seems to have been some consciousness of the nation's goal of equality for all citizens, although the attitude of the
New Mexicans in the Mexican period was much less sanguine
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about integration than when Pedro Bautista Pino wrote his 1812
report to the Spanish Cortes. 12 In January 1825 the governor of
New Mexico received a communication from a superior in Durango which pointed out that all inhabitants of the nation were
Mexicans under the same government. 13 He was referring to the
nomadic tribes, some of whom were friends of the government
while others were enemies. At a later date, New Mexicans made
clear that they considered the Pueblos to be good citizens along
with those who served in the military. So, even though the
ideological crusade of the Liberals in Mexico failed to take root in
the Borderlands, there was some awareness of the national goal of
uniting all races and peoples under one government.
Unfortunately, the enlightened objectives of the idealists failed
to take root in New Mexico. The central government denied New
Mexico the support it needed to woo the Indians successfully until
it was too late. The sparse number of settlements, the agility and
mobility of. horsed Indians, and the inadequate military strength
of the New Mexicans contributed to a situation in which the Indians managed to maintain the upper hand. Additionally, New
Mexicans persisted in maintaining all kinds of local arrangements
with Indians, some of which were based on mutual economic
needs, with the result that almost any policy, be it national or provincial, was undermined by the perpetuation of private business
practices.
Local New Mexican authorities tried to adapt to the specialized
conditions of the frontier while keeping in mind the policies the
central government dictated. Armijo's success, in fact, was largely
due to his willingness to take matters into his hands and report
what he had accomplished ex post facto. Since nothing succeeds
like success, he earned the respect of the central government until
the situation in Texas and the United States demonstrated that
New Mexico was a weak appendage of the Mexican republic and
vulnerable to attack.
But even Armijo, in his way, had followed the essential principles of the Galvez Indian policy. He saw the connection between
good trade relations and peace with the Indians, and his reputation as a battlefield commander served to rally the inhabitants of
New Mexico when a call went out for volunteers to punish renegade Indians. If the Mexican Indian policy differed from that of
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the Spanish, the difference was one of degree: The northern
Borderlands were far more turbulent between 1821 and 1846
than they had been in the days of Galvez, and the means for executing the policy were generally inadequate to cope with the
disturbances caused by the arrival of North Americans. But the
policy had changed little in seventy-five years. What remains to be
studied are the measures that New Mexicans took, apart from
government policy, which affected their relations with the Indians
in day-to-day living.
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